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WORKING AROUND WORK CHOICES: COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AND THE COMMON LAW 
ANDREW STEWART∗ AND JOELLEN RILEY† 
[Since the early 1990s, the parties to collective workplace agreements have been encouraged to give 
their bargains statutory effect by registering them under industrial legislation. Yet in the wake of the 
High Court’s Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union ruling in 2004, and the 
introduction of ‘prohibited content’ rules as part of the Work Choices reforms, there has been a 
resurgence in the use of unregistered agreements that depend on the common law for legal effect. 
This article examines the use of such agreements and various barriers to their enforceability. It also 
looks at options for resolving disputes outside the courts — in particular whether parties can ask 
members of Australia’s publicly funded industrial tribunals to provide private dispute resolution 
services.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The Howard government’s ‘Work Choices’ reforms1 have generated a great 
deal of academic comment,2 not to mention public debate. They also played a 
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 1 The reforms were introduced by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 
(Cth), the bulk of which took effect on 27 March 2006. Two further sets of amendments were 
subsequently made: Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Independent Contractors) Act 
2006 (Cth); Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) Act 2007 (Cth). The latter 
of these represented a significant backdown by the government, in reinstating some measure of 
protection against workers being asked (or forced) to bargain away certain award entitlements. 
 2 For a general overview of the reforms: see, eg, David Peetz, ‘Coming Soon to a Workplace Near 
You — The New Industrial Relations Revolution’ (2005) 31 Australian Bulletin of Labour 90; 
Chris Briggs, Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, ‘Federal IR 
Reform: The Shape of Things to Come’ (Report commissioned by Unions NSW, 2005); Joellen 
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significant part in the government’s defeat at the 2007 election. The changes, 
paradoxically made in the name of deregulation of the labour market, have 
significantly increased both the quantity and complexity of the federal legisla-
tion that governs employment conditions and industrial relations.3 In so doing, 
they have confirmed that labour law is now primarily a field grounded in 
statutory regulation. 
Nonetheless, an interesting by-product of the reform process has been to focus 
attention on the potential of the common law to provide an alternative to the 
statutory scheme embodied in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘WRA’) 
and the Workplace Relations Regulations 2006 (Cth) (‘WR Regulations’).4 Given 
the continuing role of the common law in both defining and regulating individ-
ual employment relationships,5 it is unsurprising that much of the initial com-
mentary has concentrated on that area. With so many of the Work Choices 
reforms enhancing managerial power at the expense of workers, it has become 
important to consider how that power might be moderated or constrained by 
recourse to established principles of equity or the evolving concept of fair 
dealing in contractual relations.6 The removal of statutory unfair dismissal rights, 
in particular, has prompted writers to consider whether dismissed employees 
might be able to look to the courts for relief from ‘bad faith’ terminations.7 
A further area for debate has emerged from the plan of the newly elected 
Australian Labor Party (‘ALP’) government to abolish individual Australian 
Workplace Agreements (‘AWAs’). The ALP has repeatedly suggested that 
common law contracts — that is, terms expressly accepted as part of a worker’s 
 
Riley and Kathryn Peterson, Work Choices: A Guide to the 2005 Changes (2006); Andrew Stew-
art, ‘Work Choices in Overview: Big Bang or Slow Burn?’ (2006) 16(2) Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 25; Sean Cooney, John Howe and Jill Murray, ‘Time and Money under Work 
Choices: Understanding the New Workplace Relations Act as a Scheme of Regulation’ (2006) 
29(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 215; Jill Murray, ‘Work Choices and the 
Radical Revision of the Public Realm of Australian Statutory Labour Law’ (2006) 35 Industrial 
Law Journal 343. 
 3 See Andrew Stewart, ‘A Simple Plan for Reform? The Problem of Complexity in Workplace 
Regulation’ (2005) 31 Australian Bulletin of Labour 210. 
 4 The constitutional validity of this legislation was upheld by the High Court in New South 
Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1. The scheme applies to all trading, financial and 
foreign corporations, all Commonwealth agencies and all other employers operating in Victoria 
or the territories. These are collectively referred to in this article as ‘federal system employers’. 
 5 See generally Breen Creighton and Richard Mitchell, ‘The Contract of Employment in 
Australian Labour Law’ in Lammy Betten (ed), The Employment Contract in Transforming 
Labour Relations (1995) 129; Andrew Stewart, ‘Redefining Employment? Meeting the Chal-
lenge of Contract and Agency Labour’ (2002) 15 Australian Journal of Labour Law 235, 235–7; 
Richard Johnstone and Richard Mitchell, ‘Regulating Work’ in Christine Parker et al (eds), 
Regulating Law (2004) 101; Rosemary Owens and Joellen Riley, The Law of Work (2007) ch 5. 
The ‘definitional’ role of the common law has been enhanced by the Independent Contractors 
Act 2006 (Cth) s 7, which seeks to prevent the states and territories in certain contexts from 
deeming or treating workers as ‘employees’ when they are not so regarded at common law: see 
Joellen Riley, ‘A Fair Deal for the Entrepreneurial Worker? Self-Employment and Independent 
Contracting Post Work Choices’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 246; Andrew 
Stewart, Piper Alderman, Understanding Independent Contractors (2007) ch 4. 
 6 See Joellen Riley, Employee Protection at Common Law (2005) chs 3–5. 
 7 See Carolyn Sutherland, ‘Regulating Dismissals: The Impact of Unfair Dismissal Legislation on 
the Common Law Contract of Employment’ in Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and 
Labour Market Regulation (2006) 242; Andrew Stewart, ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing at Work’ 
in Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 579, 587–9. 
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employment contract — are capable of delivering flexible and efficient out-
comes for businesses, without impairing the integrity of the safety net set by 
legislation, awards and/or collective agreements.8 This claim has been chal-
lenged by employer groups, notably in the mining industry.9 But the ALP has 
nonetheless promised that all awards will contain ‘flexibility clauses’ that give 
employers and individual employees the freedom to vary the effect of the award 
in certain ways, provided always that the employees are not disadvantaged. 
Furthermore, awards will have no application to employees with guaranteed 
annual earnings of at least $100 000.10 
In this article, however, our focus is on collective rather than individual rela-
tions. The Work Choices reforms have imposed stringent and intrusive controls 
on collective bargaining11 — at least where employment conditions are in-
volved.12 Employers and trade unions in the federal system, who would prefer to 
operate on a pre-reform ‘business as usual’ basis, have been using common law 
agreements to sidestep the Work Choices constraints and maintain mutual 
commitments to former practices. The Rudd government has undertaken to 
remove most of the current restrictions on the content of workplace agree-
ments.13 But they remain in force at the time of writing, and full details of the 
proposed changes are yet to emerge. Furthermore, without a majority in the 
Senate the new government is not assured of having its proposals accepted by 
 
 8 See, eg, ABC Television, ‘Julia Gillard Talks to the ABC about Industrial Relations’, The 7:30 
Report, 17 May 2007 <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1926254.htm>. 
 9 See, eg, Workplace Policy Division, Australian Mines and Metals Association, ‘Australian 
Workplace Agreements — A Major Matter for Miners’ (Paper released at the AMMA National 
Conference, Perth, 22 March 2007) 19–22. 
 10 Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, ‘Forward with Fairness: Policy Implementation Plan’ (Policy 
Statement, 28 August 2007) 9–12. 
 11 See generally Anthony Forsyth and Carolyn Sutherland, ‘Collective Labour Relations under 
Siege: The Work Choices Legislation and Collective Bargaining’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal 
of Labour Law 183; Sean Cooney, ‘Command and Control in the Workplace: Agree-
ment-Making under Work Choices’ (2006) 16(2) Economic and Labour Relations Review 147; 
Iain Ross, John Trew and Tim Sharard, Bargaining under Work Choices (2006). It should be 
noted that we are concerned in this article with collective bargaining, a process that almost 
invariably involves one or more trade unions. This can be contrasted with the process of making 
‘employee collective agreements’ which (as with AWAs) generally involves little real bargain-
ing, but rather a unilateral formulation by management of terms to which a group of workers are 
prepared to assent: see Chris Briggs and Rae Cooper, ‘Between Individualism and Collectivism? 
Why Employers Choose Non-Union Collective Agreements’ (2006) 17(2) Labour and Industry 
1. As to ‘employer greenfields agreements’ under s 330 of the WRA, which are made by em-
ployers without the formal involvement of any other party, it is a testament to the newspeak that 
now pervades the WRA that they can even be termed ‘collective agreements’. For discussion of 
the take-up of employer greenfields agreements under Work Choices: see David Peetz, ‘Assess-
ing the Impact of “WorkChoices” — One Year On’ (Report to the Department of Innovation, 
Industry and Regional Development, Victoria, 2007) 25–6; Peter Gahan, ‘Employer Greenfield 
Agreements in Victoria’ (Research report prepared for the Victorian Office of the Workplace 
Rights Advocate, 2007). 
 12 By contrast, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been amended to make it easier for 
non-employed contractors to engage in collective bargaining: see Shae McCrystal, ‘Regulating 
Collective Rights in Bargaining: Employees, Self-Employed Persons and Small Businesses’ in 
Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 597; Shae 
McCrystal, ‘Collective Bargaining by Independent Contractors: Challenges from Labour Law’ 
(2007) 20 Australian Journal of Labour Law 1; Shae McCrystal, ‘Collective Bargaining and the 
Trade Practices Act: The Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act [No 1] 2006 (Cth)’ (2007) 
20 Australian Journal of Labour Law 207. 
 13 See below n 180 and accompanying text. 
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Parliament. Accordingly, we will examine the use of unregistered agreements 
and potential obstacles to making enforceable collective agreements between 
management and labour, by reference to the law as it stands at the beginning of 
2008. 
Even if the existing restrictions are ultimately removed, it is still worth consid-
ering the shape that a system of collective bargaining might take if truly based on 
the concept of freedom of contract and regulated by principles of general 
commercial law. Whether the common law might be marshalled to support an 
entire system of such bargaining, rather than merely as a device to escape the 
inconveniences currently associated with registering a workplace agreement, is 
an issue to which we hope to return in the future. 
I I   THE USE OF  UNREGISTERED AGREEMENTS  
There is nothing new about the practice of employers and unions negotiating 
terms that have legal effect through the common law of contract. For the greater 
part of the 20th century, it was common to find parties making agreements that 
were neither registered under an industrial statute nor presented to a tribunal for 
adoption as a consent award. These agreements most often dealt with matters 
that were specific to a particular workplace, involved over-award commitments, 
or set a framework for industry or sector-wide conditions.14 Their legality was 
rarely, if ever, tested. If a dispute arose over their effect, it was usually resolved 
either ‘on the ground’ or with the (often informal) assistance of an industrial 
tribunal. 
From the early 1990s onwards, however, legislative changes in all jurisdictions 
not only promoted enterprise-level bargaining as the primary method of deter-
mining wages and employment conditions, but sought to encourage parties to 
formalise and register their agreements.15 Within a few years, around 40 per cent 
of employees were covered by registered collective agreements.16 These instru-
ments did not necessarily supplant other forms of regulation: for instance, many 
of them operated alongside or even incorporated award provisions, rather than 
supplanting them. The same was often true of unregistered agreements or 
understandings previously made between the parties. It was common to find 
clauses in registered agreements that acknowledged the existence of informal 
commitments, or indeed preserved their effect.17 Nonetheless, for at least a 
 
 14 See Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (4th ed, 2005) 191–4. 
 15 For general accounts of these changes: see, eg, Australian Centre for Industrial Relations 
Research and Training, Australia at Work: Just Managing? (1999) ch 3; Duncan MacDonald, 
Iain Campbell and John Burgess, ‘Ten Years of Enterprise Bargaining in Australia: An Introduc-
tion’ (2001) 12(1) Labour and Industry 1; Andrew Stewart, ‘The AIRC’s Evolving Role in Polic-
ing Bargaining’ (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour Law 245. 
 16 The most recent statistics from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’) show 38.1 per cent of 
employees as having their pay set by a registered collective agreement: ABS, Employee Earn-
ings and Hours, Australia: May 2006, ABS Catalogue No 6306.0 (2007) 6. Since it is possible to 
be covered by an agreement but receive higher pay by way of some individual arrangement, this 
may slightly understate the coverage of such instruments. 
 17 As to this kind of ‘layering’ of regulatory instruments: see Joel Fetter and Richard Mitchell, ‘The 
Legal Complexity of Workplace Regulation and Its Impact upon Functional Flexibility in Aus-
tralian Workplaces’ (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Labour Law 276; Mark Bray and Peter 
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decade it became the norm for employers and unions to think in terms of 
expressing their bargains in a registered instrument.18 
The interest in unregistered agreements was effectively revived by a technical-
ity that emerged in the federal system of agreement making under what was then 
Part VIB of the WRA. Even before the Work Choices reforms sought to emascu-
late collective bargaining under the WRA, unions and their legal advisers were 
investigating ways of making effective agreements under the common law to 
secure commitments to workplace management practices that might not concern 
‘matters pertaining’19 to the employment relationships in question. 
I I I   ‘MATTERS PERTAINING’ AND ‘PROHIBITED CONTENT’  
The ‘matters pertaining’ requirement has a long and unhappy history in Austra-
lian labour law. It was originally part of the definition of the term ‘industrial 
matters’ in s 4 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth). The Com-
monwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (and later the Common-
wealth/Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission) could only deal 
with a dispute — and hence make an award — regarding such matters. This led 
to frequent litigation as to whether the Court/Commission was empowered to 
regulate a given matter, on the basis that it might or might not have the necessary 
connection to the employment relationships covered by the dispute. The result 
was a series of High Court decisions that sought to distinguish between matters 
that ‘directly’ pertained to employment, and those that lacked a sufficient 
connection. It did not help that many of these decisions could not be readily 
reconciled with one another, that form often seemed to matter more than 
substance, and that some of the reasoning bordered on the arcane.20 
For a time, after the shift to formalised bargaining in the 1990s, parties seemed 
to forget about the requirement that agreements must deal with matters pertain-
ing to the employment relationship. However, it was still there in the legislation, 
a point highlighted in the litigation that culminated in the High Court’s 2004 
decision in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union 
(‘Electrolux’).21 Here the Court interpreted the WRA to mean that every substan-
tive provision in a certified agreement must directly pertain to employment for 
the agreement to be registrable.22 Furthermore, industrial action could not be 
‘protected’ (that is, lawful) under what was then s 170ML of the WRA if taken in 
support of a proposed agreement that contained a single ‘non-pertaining’ clause 
— in that case, a provision for a bargaining agent’s fee to be paid by employees, 
whether union members or not.23 
 
Waring, ‘“Complexity” and “Congruence” in Australian Labour Regulation’ (2005) 47 Journal 
of Industrial Relations 1, 3–6; Stewart, ‘A Simple Plan for Reform?’, above n 3, 212–16. 
 18 See Mark Wooden, The Transformation of Australian Industrial Relations (2000) 59–65. 
 19 See WRA ss 170LI, 170LO–LP (repealed). 
 20 See generally Creighton and Stewart, above n 14, 97–104. 
 21 (2004) 221 CLR 309. 
 22 Ibid 327–8 (Gleeson CJ), 351–6 (McHugh J), 369–71 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
 23 The Court held that such a clause did not pertain to employment relations, analogising with 
earlier decisions to the effect that a claim for the deduction of union dues from wages cannot 
found an industrial dispute: see R v Portus; Ex parte Australia & New Zealand Banking Group 
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Given the number of agreements with potentially suspect clauses, the Elec-
trolux ruling caused consternation for parties. The prospect of an apparently 
settled certified agreement being dislodged by the discovery of an impermissible 
term was a particular concern to employers who did not want to face a premature 
round of bargaining, with its attendant capacity for protected industrial action. 
These worries were partly allayed when legislation was passed preventing 
agreements registered before the date of the Electrolux decision being rendered 
wholly invalid.24 However, confusion quickly emerged as to the ability to 
register new agreements. With the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(‘AIRC’) now required to test proposed agreements by reference to principles 
derived from a complex and confused line of High Court authorities, it is 
scarcely surprising that different members of the AIRC disagreed as to which 
clauses pertained and which did not.25 
The status of a number of contested clauses was effectively resolved by a 
decision of a Full Bench of the AIRC in a test case in March 2005.26 While the 
Full Bench took a fairly liberal view of what could be regarded as a matter 
pertaining to employment relations, it held that a number of provisions com-
monly included in union negotiated agreements must be omitted. These included 
clauses relating to the automatic deduction of union dues from wages, prohibi-
tions on the engagement of independent contractors or labour hire workers to do 
work hitherto performed by employees, and provisions conferring a broad right 
on union officials to enter workplaces. 
With the inclusion of non-pertaining clauses now threatening the validity of 
agreements, a practice quickly developed where unions sought to negotiate two 
separate instruments: the formal agreement that would be put to the AIRC for 
certification, and a separate or ‘side’ agreement that would contain all the 
provisions that either could not or might not be capable of satisfying the matters 
pertaining test. These latter provisions would often have been standard inclusions 
in agreements certified over the previous decade. The side agreement might be 
described as a contract, formalised as a deed or simply set out in a letter of 
understanding signed by the employer. 
 
Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 353; Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufac-
turing and Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96 (‘Re Alcan’). The Court’s reasoning has 
been that ‘although the subject matter [deduction of union dues] pertains to a relationship be-
tween employers and employees, it is a relationship involving employees as union members 
and not at all as employees’: Re Alcan (1994) 181 CLR 86, 107 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, 
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
 24 See WRA pt VIB div 10A (repealed), introduced by the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Agreement Validation) Act 2004 (Cth) sch 1(1). The operation of these provisions in relation to 
pre-reform agreements has been preserved by the amended WRA sch 7 cl 2(1)(p). However, any 
certified agreements (or indeed AWAs) registered between 2 September 2004 and 27 March 
2006 are not covered by the pre-reform WRA provisions. Hence these agreements can be invali-
dated if found to contain a non-pertaining clause. 
 25 For analysis of the post-Electrolux case law: see Jason Harris, ‘Federal Collective Bargaining 
after Electrolux’ (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 45. 
 26 Re Rural City of Murray Bridge Nursing Employees, ANF (Aged Care) — Enterprise Agreement 
2004 (2005) 142 IR 289. For further AIRC full bench decisions on the ‘matters pertaining’ issue: 
see, eg, National Union of Workers; Re Agreement with Exel (Australia) Logistics Pty Ltd (2005) 
146 IR 334; Heinemann Electric Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, 
Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2006) 157 IR 1. 
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In March 2006, the practice of seeking an unregistered agreement became 
almost compulsory for many unions, with the enactment of the ‘prohibited 
content’ rules.27 These rules perfectly illustrate the ‘command and control’ 
mentality pervading the Work Choices reforms,28 and make a mockery of any 
commitment to promoting ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ in workplace bargaining.29 As 
Jill Murray notes: 
Work Choices is based on a fundamental mistrust of employers, the favoured 
regulators under the system. The government seems [to] be afraid that they will 
collude in the reversion to the collective, civilising, fair standards and proce-
dures of the traditional system.30 
Section 357 of the amended WRA currently provides that an employer must not 
lodge a workplace agreement that contains prohibited content. A reckless breach 
of this provision may expose the employer to a penalty of up to $33 000.31 
Indeed, any person who recklessly proposes the inclusion of prohibited content 
in an agreement, or misrepresents an agreement as not containing prohibited 
content, risks a similar penalty under ss 365 and 366 of the WRA. Section 358 
also provides that a term of an agreement will be void to the extent that it 
contains prohibited content, though the wording of the provision makes it clear 
that it is only that term that is affected, not the entire agreement. 
Under the original version of s 356 of the WRA, it was left entirely to regula-
tions to define prohibited content.32 When reg 8.5–8.7 of chapter 2 of the WR 
Regulations were promulgated, they set out a lengthy list of such matters. 
Besides specifying that matters not pertaining to the employment relationship 
would remain prohibited,33 the regulations also outlined a far more extensive list 
of forbidden content — including a number of matters that had previously been 
ruled by the AIRC to satisfy the matters pertaining test.34 
Much of what is prohibited is specifically targeted at excluding union in-
volvement in statutory workplace bargaining. For example, payroll deduction for 
union dues, union training leave and guaranteed union involvement in dispute 
 
 27 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) sch 1 div 7B. 
 28 See Cooney, above n 11; John Howe, ‘“Deregulation” of Labour Relations in Australia: Towards 
a More “Centred” Command and Control Model’ in Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law 
and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 147. 
 29 Stewart, ‘Work Choices in Overview’, above n 2, 35. 
 30 Murray, above n 2, 365. See also ibid 35, 52. 
 31 WRA s 407(2)(k). 
 32 Section 356 was amended by the Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) Act 
2007 (Cth) sch 4. It now defines ‘prohibited content’ to include a few specified matters, together 
with any further matters prescribed by regulation. The matters listed in WRA s 356 are taken 
from the definition of an ‘objectionable provision’ in s 810. The inclusion of such a provision 
was already treated as prohibited content by WR Regulations ch 2 reg 8.5(7). Even after the 
amendment, the bulk of what is defined as prohibited content is still to be found in the WR 
Regulations. 
 33 See WR Regulations ch 2 reg 8.7. In line with the post-Electrolux case law, the regulation 
specifies that matters of an ‘incidental’, ‘ancillary’ or ‘machinery’ nature may still be included in 
an agreement, even if they do not satisfy the matters pertaining requirement. 
 34 For example, the imposition of conditions on the use of contract labour is now prohibited by WR 
Regulations ch 2 reg 8.5(1)(h), but was previously found to be a matter capable of pertaining to 
employment: see, eg, National Union of Workers; Re Agreement with Exel (Australia) Logistics 
Pty Ltd (2005) 146 IR 334. 
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resolution procedures are specifically proscribed.35 A number of other provisions 
which more subtly support the continued influence of unions in workplaces are 
also prohibited, including clauses dealing with engagement of independent 
contractors and labour hire workers, limitations on offering AWAs, and even the 
process for renegotiating an agreement.36 
Besides the restrictions that these rules seek to place on unions, they have also 
caused considerable difficulty for employers due to the uncertainty of what is 
prohibited. This is partly because some of the rules are capable of variable 
interpretations, not least the matters pertaining requirement. It is also a reflection 
of the fact that under the Work Choices system there is no chance of getting a 
formal ruling on contentious clauses, unless someone is actually prosecuted for 
proposing prohibited content, or the Workplace Authority (formerly the Office of 
the Employment Advocate) chooses to take action under s 363 of the WRA to 
vary an agreement to remove such content,37 or the issue arises in the context of 
a union seeking to take protected industrial action.38 
Under the previous system, issues could be raised with or by the AIRC during 
the certification process and then made the subject of a formal decision, which 
could in turn be appealed to a full bench.39 The publication of these judgments 
ensured both that the AIRC and parties generally became aware of what was and 
was not permissible, despite the fact that it might take time to resolve differences 
between individual members of the AIRC. This process no longer occurs now 
that agreements are simply lodged with the Workplace Authority and can take 
effect without formal scrutiny.40 
It is true that employers may seek a pre-lodgement assessment of an agreement 
by the Workplace Authority to determine whether it contains prohibited content. 
If the draft agreement is cleared, the employer may rely on that assessment to 
defend any prosecution for recklessly lodging an agreement with prohibited 
content.41 However, as many employers have found out, this can be a frustrating 
process. Aside from the delays that waiting for advice can cause in finalising an 
agreement,42 officials reviewing agreements frequently (and perhaps wisely) 
 
 35 WR Regulations ch 2 reg 8.5(1)(a)–(f). 
 36 WR Regulations ch 2 regs 8.5(1)(e), (h), (i), (8). 
 37 In such a case the variation itself, though not the reasons for making it, is gazetted: see, eg, the 
notices that appear in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No GN23, 13 June 2007, 1592–4. 
 38 Action is not protected if taken in support of the inclusion of prohibited content in an agreement: 
WRA s 436. See also Heinemann Electric Pty Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, 
Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2006) 157 IR 1. 
The issue may also arise in connection with an application for a protected action ballot order: see 
below nn 68–81 and accompanying text. 
 39 Pre-reform WRA s 45(1)(e). 
 40 Under the ‘fairness test’ introduced by the Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety 
Net) Act 2007 (Cth), most agreements require review to determine whether ‘fair compensation’ 
has been provided for the exclusion or modification of ‘protected award conditions’, and may be 
rescinded if they do not: see WRA pt 8 div 5A. There is no such requirement in relation to pro-
hibited content. 
 41 WRA s 357(2). Note though that this protects only the employer, not anyone else (including 
individual managers, union officials and even lawyers or consultants) who may have been 
involved in drafting the agreement. 
 42 See, eg, Workplace Express, Employer Fears on Prohibited Content Slowing down Bargaining, 
Unions Claim (21 September 2006) Workplace Express <http://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/>. 
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‘hedge their bets’, indicating that they cannot say for certain that a particular 
clause might not qualify as prohibited content. Worse still, it is not uncommon 
for the same clause to be cleared by one official and then questioned by an-
other.43 All of this is exacerbated by the fact that none of these rulings are made 
public and that there are no formal procedures for external or internal review.44 
IV  CURRENT STRATEGIES 
In light of the limitations and uncertainties that the prohibited content rules 
have created, it is not surprising that unions have turned attention to the potential 
for using common law agreements to secure the commitment of union-friendly 
employers to continue with former practices.  
The most common strategy seems to be the one already mentioned: simultane-
ously pursuing a registered instrument that will deal with wage increases and a 
range of other matters, and a side agreement to cover any content that might be 
prohibited. 
An interesting alternative, however, has been to seek only an unregistered 
agreement, while leaving any pre-Work Choices agreement on foot. The transi-
tional provisions in sch 7 of the WRA allow certified agreements in force as of 
27 March 2006 to remain in force indefinitely, at least where made by a federal 
system employer.45 Importantly, pre-reform certified agreements are not required 
to comply with the prohibited content provisions, except in one respect: any 
clauses precluding the employer from making AWAs are prohibited in all kinds 
of agreements, pre-reform and post-reform.46 Of course, the agreement must deal 
only with matters pertaining to employment, but that is a function of the 
pre-reform legislation (as interpreted in Electrolux), rather than the new rules on 
prohibited content. That aside, pre-reform certified agreements can be left in 
place without the need to vet them for compliance with the restrictions intro-
duced by Work Choices. The same is true of a ‘preserved state agreement’ that 
has effect under Part 2 of sch 8 of the WRA. 
A further advantage, especially for employers, is that a pre-reform agreement 
does not have to comply with the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard in 
Part 7 of the WRA, at least to the extent that the agreement deals with a ‘matter’ 
also covered by the Standard.47 This avoids the need to apply the highly complex 
 
 43 See, eg, Submission to Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) Bill 2007, 2007, Submission No 8, 14 (Cath Bowtell, Aus-
tralian Council of Trade Unions). 
 44 See Senate Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Education, 
Parliament of Australia, Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) Bill 2007 
(2007) [2.59]–[2.60], [2.83]–[2.89], [3.37]–[3.39], [4.25]–[4.27], [5.16], [6.17]–[6.18], noting 
similar concerns about the potential for inconsistent and unaccountable decision-making by the 
Workplace Authority under the new ‘fairness test’. 
 45 Cf pre-reform agreements involving excluded (non-federal system) employers which have a 
maximum duration of five years: WRA sch 7 pt 2 div 2. 
 46 See WRA sch 7 cl 8. 
 47 WRA sch 7 cl 30, sch 8 cl 15E. As originally drafted, these provisions ensured that the entitle-
ments in the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard would not apply at all to workers who 
remained covered by a pre-reform federal agreement or a preserved state agreement. In Decem-
ber 2006, however, they were amended with retrospective effect by the Workplace Relations 
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rules that determine whether a particular provision in a post-Work Choices 
agreement does or does not provide a more ‘favourable’ outcome than the 
Standard in some ‘particular respect’48 — a question which can prove quite 
difficult in respect of some kinds of benefits, especially leave entitlements. 
Of course, pre-reform agreements cannot be varied — hence the utility of an 
unregistered agreement. The parties can make a common law agreement to deal 
with matters of pay and any other improvements in benefits, while leaving the 
pre-reform agreement in place. If an employer is satisfied with the existing 
agreement, this may well be regarded as a less troublesome option than dealing 
with the new system for making workplace agreements. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that unregistered agreements have once again 
become quite common,49 although many of the organisations using these 
arrangements are reluctant to publicise their agreements, lest they attract 
unwanted political attention — or, in the specific case of the building and 
construction industry, threaten their eligibility to be involved in certain pro-
jects.50 There is sometimes also a concern about the enforceability of unregis-
tered agreements. 
The extent of this last concern should not be overstated. In practical terms, 
unions that are able to secure a written undertaking on matters of prohibited 
content will usually be satisfied that the commitment will be observed, whatever 
the strict legalities.51 In the world of industrial relations, managers do not lightly 
go back on explicit promises. But there are always exceptions, and disputes may 
in any event arise as to the meaning or scope of a provision in an unregistered 
agreement. The question of how such a dispute can be resolved may well depend 
on the precise legal status of the arrangement. 
In general, the legal effectiveness of an unregistered side agreement depends 
on two sets of issues. One set of problems arises from the WRA itself, while a 
 
Legislation Amendment (Independent Contractors) Act 2006 (Cth) sch 6(41), (45). As they now 
stand, their precise effect is difficult to gauge, as it is unclear just how extensively an agreement 
must deal with a ‘matter’ before the Standard is excluded. 
 48 See WRA s 172; WR Regulations ch 2 reg 7.1. 
 49 See also ABS, above n 16, 6 which reveals that in May 2006, 3.1 per cent of employees were 
paid in accordance with an unregistered collective agreement. This measure would tend to un-
derstate the prevalence of such arrangements, since it would not include a side agreement oper-
ating in conjunction with a registered agreement that dealt with wage rates. 
 50 Under the Australian Procurement and Construction Council, National Code of Practice for the 
Construction Industry (1997), companies are ineligible to work on Commonwealth-funded 
projects unless they comply with the Code and its attendant Guidelines in relation to all of their 
construction work, whether Commonwealth-funded or not. In November 2006, the Guidelines 
were revised to provide that a company will not be Code-compliant if it enters into an unregis-
tered agreement that deals with matters that would be prohibited content if included in a work-
place agreement: see Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Australian Govern-
ment, Implementation Guidelines for the National Code of Practice for the Construction Indus-
try (2006) s 8.1.2. The revision was made without prior warning and caused consternation for 
parties who had already negotiated such agreements: see Workplace Express, Bargaining Chaos, 
as Government Shifts Construction Code Goal Posts — Again (9 November 2006) Workplace 
Express <http://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/>. See also Anthony Forsyth et al, Workplace 
Relations in the Building and Construction Industry (2007) ch 3. 
 51 See, eg, Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Thiess Pty Ltd (Unreported, 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, 19 October 2006) [23]–[24], where the 
union was recorded as seeking ‘a “gentleman’s agreement” — a matter of honour — rather than 
a legally enforceable agreement.’ 
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second set involves the general principles of law governing the enforceability of 
common law agreements. We shall address each in turn and also look at the 
options that parties may have for resolving disputes under these agreements 
outside the ordinary courts, notably in the industrial tribunals. 
V  DOES THE WRA  PRESENT AN INSUPERABLE OBSTACLE? 
One question to address, in contemplating a common law collective agreement 
dealing with subject matter prohibited by the WRA, is whether such an agreement 
can in fact achieve what the legislation expressly prohibits in a statutory bargain. 
Under the pre-reform WRA, it was clear from provisions such as ss 170LH and 
170LN that a ‘certified agreement’ was an agreement that the parties had applied 
to have certified by the AIRC. In the Electrolux decision, it was made plain that 
employers and unions were also at liberty to make ordinary common law 
agreements, and that these agreements would not be constrained by the statute’s 
requirements about ‘matters pertaining to employment’.52 The enforceability of 
any common law agreement would depend on compliance with the general law. 
These statements echo an earlier observation by the High Court in Construction, 
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commis-
sion (‘Private Arbitration Case’).53 It was noted there that a collective agreement 
which exceeded what was allowable under the WRA (in this instance, in relation 
to a dispute resolution clause) could nevertheless be enforceable at common law: 
‘the underlying agreement remains, and the validity of that agreement depends 
on the general law, not the legislative provisions’.54 
Unfortunately, the Work Choices provisions on workplace agreements are 
ambiguous in this respect. Following the Work Choices amendments, a ‘work-
place agreement’ is simply an agreement ‘approved’ by the parties at the work-
place, and then lodged with the Workplace Authority.55 It has effect upon 
lodgement.56 The question arises whether such a broad description of a work-
place agreement is apt to capture all agreements made between employers and 
employees. If so, does this mean that the former law allowing for the existence 
of common law agreements between employers and unions has been impliedly 
overruled? 
The definitions of each type of workplace agreement offer little assistance 
with this question. Under the amended WRA definitions in s 4(1), a ‘workplace 
agreement’ means ‘(a) an AWA; or (b) a collective agreement’. A note to this 
definition refers to s 324, which states that a reference to a workplace agreement 
includes a reference to a ‘proposed workplace agreement’. A ‘collective agree-
ment’ is defined, also in s 4(1), to mean any one of the five kinds of collective 
agreements provided for in Part 8 of the WRA, including ‘a union collective 
agreement’. Section 328 provides that an employer ‘may make an agreement (a 
union collective agreement) in writing with one or more organisations of 
 
 52 (2004) 221 CLR 309, 353 (McHugh J), 368 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
 53 (2001) 203 CLR 645. 
 54 Ibid 658 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
 55 WRA ss 340, 342(1). 
 56 WRA s 347(1). 
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employees’. By virtue of s 333(c), such an agreement is taken to be ‘made’ when 
those parties ‘agree to the terms of the agreement’. 
On one interpretation of this very general language, the definition of a ‘union 
collective agreement’ in s 328 would include any written employer–union 
agreement, regardless of whether the parties intended it to be lodged with the 
Workplace Authority. But under s 347(1), a workplace agreement only ‘comes 
into operation’ on the day it is lodged, and the parties can only be ‘bound’ by an 
agreement under s 351 if it is ‘in operation’. Section 348(1) also provides that 
only one workplace agreement can ‘have effect’ in relation to a given employee. 
On a literal reading of these provisions, unlodged agreements are to have no 
effect, even at common law. 
There are at least two alternative interpretations, however, which avoid this 
result. One is that the reference in s 328 of the WRA to a ‘union collective 
agreement’ should be taken to apply only to an agreement that is intended by the 
parties to have effect under the WRA. The second is that the various references to 
an agreement being ‘in operation’ or ‘in effect’, or to parties being ‘bound’, refer 
only to agreements having effect under the WRA. In other words, the fact that an 
unlodged agreement might not, by virtue of ss 347(1) and 351, be able to create 
any statutory rights and obligations should not prevent the agreement having 
effect at common law. 
This latter interpretation would be consistent with the High Court’s decision in 
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd.57 In that case (which concerned a claim that an 
award provision should be taken to have effect as a clause in the employees’ 
contracts of employment) it was held that an award creates a different kind of 
legal obligation to a common law employment contract. An industrial instrument 
created by statute has whatever legal effect the statute confers upon it, and is 
enforceable according to the terms of the statute.58 The underlying common law 
employment contract between employer and employee may derive some of its 
terms from a relevant industrial instrument, but the contract is a separate 
construct and has effect according to the principles of contract law.59 The 
reasoning in this case has been subsequently adopted in relation to registered 
agreements. It appears that the terms of such an agreement are not to be treated 
as automatically incorporated into any employment contract covered by the 
agreement.60 
The idea that a registered agreement is a purely statutory construct is also 
supported, as we have already seen, by what the High Court said about collective 
agreements in the Private Arbitration Case: 
 
 57 (1995) 185 CLR 410. 
 58 Ibid 418–20 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 456–7 (McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
 59 For a critical analysis of the decision: see Creighton and Stewart, above n 14, 312–15. 
 60 See Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280, 337–8 (Kirby J); ACTEW Corporation 
Ltd v Pangallo (2002) 127 FCR 1, 17–18 (Whitlam and Gyles JJ); Hogan v Employment Na-
tional (Administration) Pty Ltd (2002) 119 IR 59, 116–17 (Haylen J). For a recent illustration of 
the need to view registered agreements and employment contracts as separate sources of obliga-
tions: see Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Community and Public Sector 
Union (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, Hamberger SDP 
and Tolley C, 12 June 2007). 
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The parties to an industrial situation are free to agree between themselves as to 
the terms on which they will conduct their affairs. Their agreement has effect 
according to the general law. If their agreement is certified, it also has effect as 
an award. To the extent that an agreement provides in a manner that exceeds 
what is permitted either by the Constitution or by the legislation which gives 
the agreement effect as an award, it cannot operate with that effect. But the un-
derlying agreement remains and the validity of that agreement depends on the 
general law, not the legislative provisions which give it effect as an award.61 
It is also pertinent to consider the recognition given to individual workplace 
agreements (AWAs) under the WRA. If the definition of ‘union collective 
agreement’ in s 328 of the WRA includes any written agreement between an 
employer and a union, the same should logically be true of s 326, which de-
scribes an AWA in the same form of words: ‘An employer may make an agree-
ment (an Australian Workplace Agreement or AWA) in writing with a person 
whose employment will be subject to the agreement.’ It would be almost 
unthinkable to construe that definition to include all written employment 
contracts and so hold them unenforceable unless lodged with the Workplace 
Authority. That an AWA is a statutory agreement that operates by reference to an 
employment contract, rather than actually being (or in some sense superseding) 
such a contract, was assumed by the majority of the Full Court of the Federal 
Court in McLennan v Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd.62 If parties can make an 
individual common law contract, why not a common law contract between a 
union and an employer? 
Further support for the argument that the amended WRA should not be inter-
preted to deny any effect to unlodged agreements, even at common law, can be 
found in the fact that in other provisions of the WRA there are explicit references 
to common law agreements which contemplate their coexistence with lodged 
agreements made under the WRA. For example, s 173 refers to a ‘term of a 
workplace agreement or a contract’63 having no effect if it purports to exclude 
the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. Section 355(6)(b) likewise 
restricts workplace agreements from ‘calling up’ content from ‘an agreement, 
arrangement, deed or memorandum of understanding … that … regulates terms 
and conditions of employment [and] was created by a process of collective 
negotiation’. 
It is also interesting to consider s 64 of the Building and Construction Industry 
Improvement Act 2005 (Cth), which expressly provides that an uncertified 
‘project agreement’ is to be unenforceable. There is no corresponding provision 
of this type in the WRA, suggesting that the legislature did not intend that 
common law agreements be generally prohibited. 
Finally, there is s 811(2) of the WRA. This states that a ‘provision of an indus-
trial instrument, or an agreement or arrangement (whether written or unwritten)’ 
is void if it permits contravention of the freedom of association protections in 
 
 61 (2001) 203 CLR 645, 658 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ). 
 62 (2005) 142 FCR 105. See also Creighton and Stewart, above n 14, 315–16. Cf Fetter and 
Mitchell, above n 17, 278, 287. 
 63 Emphasis added. 
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Part 16 of the WRA. The definitions to this Part in s 779 provide that an ‘indus-
trial instrument’ means ‘an award or agreement’ that is made under an ‘industrial 
law’, the WRA being included in the subsequent definition of ‘industrial law’. 
The fact that s 811(2) refers to both industrial instruments (including workplace 
agreements made under Part 8 of the WRA) and other written or unwritten 
agreements implies that an agreement between industrial parties can exist outside 
of the prescription of WRA workplace agreements, and that these will only be 
void to the extent that they are objectionable within the terms of s 811 (or any 
other specific provision). It would be unnecessary to declare such an agreement 
or arrangement void if it were already made unenforceable by Part 8 of the WRA. 
In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Ulan Coal Mines Ltd,64 
Lawler V-P accepted that a common law ‘side agreement’ proposed between an 
employer and a union was a valid expression of the parties’ freedom to contract: 
Freedom of contract is a basic right in our legal system. Such a right is not to be 
taken as having been removed or cut down by legislation unless it is done so 
with clear words. There is nothing in the Act which expressly prevents a union 
and an employer from reaching a common law agreement about matters that 
would be prohibited content in a workplace agreement made under the Act.65 
This decision would not be binding on a court subsequently required to adjudi-
cate on the validity of one of these side agreements. On balance, though, the 
courts seem more likely to interpret the new workplace agreement provisions as 
being intended only to affect statutory rights and obligations, not rights and 
obligations that might have effect at common law by virtue of an unlodged 
agreement — except where, as in s 811(2) of the WRA, the contrary intention is 
made clear. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of a court adopting a more literal interpretation 
cannot be ruled out. Certainly, the possibility of a party interested in such an 
agreement taking the point in litigation must not be ignored. It should be 
remembered that it is often a company administrator or liquidator who will 
challenge the validity of contracts purportedly entered into by a corporation. 
These individuals are required to act in the interests of the creditors and share-
holders of the company, and do not consider themselves bound in honour to an 
agreement which might not be legally enforceable — notwithstanding any good 
faith that once existed between the employing corporation and a union. 
VI  PROTECTED ACTION AND UNREGISTERED AGREEMENTS 
One other aspect of the statutory scheme that merits consideration is the curi-
ous position in which unions may find themselves when they endeavour to take 
protected industrial action in support of their claims. 
Under s 435(2) of the WRA, employees and unions may only take protected 
action in connection with a ‘proposed collective agreement’, following the 
 
 64 (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, 13 October 2006). 
 65 Ibid [10]. See also Re Educang Certified Agreement 2002 (Unreported, Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, Richards SDP, 20 September 2006) where it was clearly assumed that an 
unregistered agreement was not to be regarded as a ‘workplace agreement’ for the purposes of 
the WRA. 
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formal initiation of a ‘bargaining period’ under Division 2 of Part 9. If the 
interpretation we have outlined above is correct, that means a registered collec-
tive agreement. Hence any flexing of industrial muscle in the negotiations for a 
common law agreement will come at the risk of the usual range of sanctions 
against unprotected industrial action, including s 496 stop orders (which are now 
mandatory whenever such action comes to the attention of the AIRC),66 and 
potential common law suits for a range of industrial torts.67 
Whilst so much is reasonably clear, an issue arises when a union is simultane-
ously seeking to negotiate both a registered and an unregistered agreement. Can 
the union take protected action purely over the registered instrument, especially 
if it is a key component of that instrument (such as the size of a wage increase) 
that has proved the real ‘sticking point’ in negotiations? 
The problem here is the requirement that in order for action to be protected, it 
must have been preceded by ‘genuine’ bargaining. For a union, this issue 
typically arises when it seeks an order from the AIRC to allow it to conduct a 
ballot to authorise industrial action.68 The introduction of this cumbersome new 
procedure is one of the key reforms made by the Work Choices amendments.69 It 
often now happens that an employer will try to head off industrial action by 
opposing the grant of a ballot order. No order means no ballot, and no ballot 
means no immunity except where action is taken in response to industrial action 
by the employer.70 One of the conditions for the grant of an order is that the 
applicant is ‘genuinely trying to reach agreement with the employer’, and indeed 
has previously tried to do so during the bargaining period.71 
In a number of cases, an employer has successfully argued that the pursuit of 
prohibited content in negotiations for a new workplace agreement will be 
evidence that a union is not ‘genuinely’ bargaining. As Acton SDP has explained, 
‘[t]he inclusion of what is clearly prohibited content in a union collective 
agreement is something an employer is unlikely to agree to because of the 
potential consequences for the employer of doing so.’72 
 
 66 As to the differences between WRA s 496 and the provision it replaced, s 127 of the pre-reform 
WRA: see Ross, Trew and Sharard, above n 11, ch 7. 
 67 As to the torts that are almost invariably committed in the course of industrial action: see 
Creighton and Stewart, above n 14, 561–72. Section 166A of the pre-reform WRA, which in at 
least some instances required a certificate from the AIRC before the commencement of tort 
proceedings, was repealed by the Work Choices amendments: Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) s 71. 
 68 An order can be sought under WRA s 451. 
 69 See Shae McCrystal, ‘Smothering the Right to Strike: Work Choices and Industrial Action’ 
(2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law 198, 203–4; Ross, Trew and Sharard, above n 11, 
ch 6; Graeme Orr and Suppiah Murugesan, ‘Mandatory Secret Ballots before Employee Indus-
trial Action’ (2007) 20 Australian Journal of Labour Law 272. 
 70 WRA s 445. 
 71 WRA s 461(1)(a), (b). 
 72 Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Kempe 
Engineering Services Pty Ltd t/as Kempe Manufacturing & Engineering Services (Unreported, 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Acton SDP, 8 August 2006) [24]. It may be differ-
ent, however, where the content is not ‘clearly’ prohibited but merely of doubtful validity: see 
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied 
Services Union of Australia v Tyco Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 157 IR 15, 21 (Giudice J, Lawler 
V-P and Williams C); Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
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Importantly, the same conclusion has been reached where the matters that 
would be prohibited content are set out in a proposed deed or memorandum of 
understanding, rather than in the draft of the registered agreement which a union 
is seeking. In Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, 
Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Cadbury Schweppes 
Australia Ltd73 it was found that the unions in question had made their assent to 
any registered agreement conditional on agreement being reached as to the side 
agreement. Since the unions were not prepared to seriously consider any offers 
made by the employer until that happened, it could not be said that they were 
genuinely bargaining. 
In that case, the evidence showed that the unions had inextricably linked the 
registered and unregistered agreements. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and 
Energy Union v Ulan Coal Mines Ltd,74 Lawler V-P considered that it would be 
different where the two instruments were being pursued separately. Having 
suggested, as we have already seen, that there was nothing in the WRA that 
expressly prevented parties reaching a common law agreement over matters that 
would be prohibited content in a registered agreement, he went on to opine: 
While the mere fact that a union contemporaneously makes claims for a side 
agreement containing prohibited content and makes other claims for a work-
place agreement strongly suggests that the union is not genuinely trying to 
reach a workplace agreement, a union may advance claims for prohibited con-
tent for inclusion in a separate common law agreement while at the same time 
genuinely trying to reach a workplace agreement under the Act, provided it is 
clear on the evidence that there is no linkage between the two such that con-
cluding the workplace agreement, or the making of a concession in relation to 
it, is made conditional upon the acceptance of a union claim for prohibited con-
tent in the separate common law agreement.75 
The question is how ready the AIRC should be to conclude that the two proc-
esses are being kept separate. In United Firefighters’ Union of Austra-
lia v Country Fire Authority,76 Commissioner Foggo had been prepared at first 
instance to grant a ballot order, despite the fact that the Union had indicated its 
desire to negotiate a deed containing prohibited content. The Commissioner 
noted that the demand for a deed had been made before the bargaining period 
had been initiated, and that the Country Fire Authority had not produced any 
evidence to show that the demand had subsequently been pressed.77 On appeal, 
however, the full bench took a different approach: 
In our view, the pursuit of claims which involve prohibited content at the same 
time as seeking a Workplace Agreement, whether the prohibited content forms 
 
Union v Skilled Group Ltd (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Sim-
monds C, 9 May 2007). 
 73 (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Acton SDP, 11 July 2006). 
 74 (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, 13 October 2006). 
 75 Ibid [13]. See also Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Thiess Pty Ltd (Unre-
ported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, 19 October 2006). 
 76 (2006) 158 IR 120. 
 77 Transcript of Proceedings, United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Country Fire Authority 
(Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Foggo C, 17 August 2006). 
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part of the proposed agreement or otherwise, strongly suggests that the Union is 
not genuinely trying to reach a Workplace Agreement which complies with the 
requirements of the Act. In the circumstances of this case, claims for prohibited 
content had been made, and at no time prior to, or during the proceedings be-
fore the Commissioner, was there any reliable evidence to show that the claims 
were no longer being pursued or were otherwise irrelevant to the negotiations 
for a collective agreement. In these circumstances, we do not believe that the 
Commissioner could have been satisfied that the [Union] was genuinely trying 
to reach an agreement during the bargaining period, or at the time of the appli-
cation.78 
In effect, therefore, once a side agreement is ‘on the table’, the onus is on the 
union to indicate that it is no longer seeking such a deal if it subsequently wishes 
to take protected action. 
The obvious step for a union is to make a formal statement that it is no longer 
pursuing the unregistered agreement. The AIRC has been prepared to recognise 
that ‘[t]he dynamics of industrial relations negotiations require a practical 
approach which acknowledges that both parties may alter their position during 
the course of negotiations for tactical or other reasons.’79 It is now accepted that 
even where a union has at one point in negotiations proposed the inclusion of 
what might be prohibited content in an agreement, it may formally withdraw the 
claims in question or indeed simply give a general indication that it will not 
pursue prohibited content. To shift position in this way does not mean that the 
union is not genuinely seeking to reach agreement.80 Similarly, it would seem, a 
union may make a tactical declaration that it is seeking to negotiate only a 
registered agreement, or at least that any negotiations over a common law 
agreement are to be regarded as an entirely separate exercise.81 With that done, 
‘genuine’ bargaining can be established and a ballot order obtained. There is, of 
course, nothing to stop the union resuming its quest for a side agreement at a 
later date. 
The absurdity of the resulting position is readily apparent, with unions and 
employers forced to adopt a ‘two track’ approach to negotiating collective 
agreements. One might well question a regulatory system that makes the legality 
 
 78 United Firefighters’ Union of Australia v Country Fire Authority (2006) 158 IR 120, 135 
(Watson V-P, Lacy SDP and Hingley C) (emphasis added). 
 79 Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Amcor 
Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Harri-
son C, 6 December 2006) [34]. See also Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Infor-
mation, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v CSBP Ltd (Unreported, 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Drake SDP, 20 April 2007) [64]. This is not to say 
that a party may continually ‘shift the goalposts’ in negotiations: see, eg, Liquor, Hospitality and 
Miscellaneous Union — Western Australian Branch v CSBP Ltd (Unreported, Australian Indus-
trial Relations Commission, McCarthy DP, 15 June 2007). 
 80 See, eg, National Union of Workers v Blue Circle Transport Pty Ltd (Unreported, Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission, Watson V-P, 11 August 2006); Communications, Electrical, 
Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Tyco 
Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 157 IR 15; Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kin-
dred Industries Union v Mayfield Engineering Pty Ltd t/as Metlabs (Unreported, Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission, Acton SDP, 21 November 2006). 
 81 See, eg, Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Un-
ion v Amcor Packaging (Australia) Pty Ltd t/as Amcor Cartons Australasia (Unreported, Austra-
lian Industrial Relations Commission, Harrison C, 6 December 2006). 
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of industrial action turn on the willingness of parties to declare that they are not 
interested in an agreement that a few days or weeks earlier was firmly on their 
agenda. 
VII   THE GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT:  SOME LIMITATIONS 
Assuming that the WRA, as currently enacted, does allow the existence of 
common law collective agreements made between unions and employers, this is 
by no means the end of the matter. As the High Court has suggested in Electrolux 
and the Private Arbitration Case, such agreements may have effect as commer-
cial agreements according to the principles of the general law.82 These principles 
can create considerable difficulties for the kinds of agreements that unions and 
employers often wish to make. 
Typically, a union seeks an agreement that will commit the employer to confer 
a stipulated range of benefits on all, or a given class, of employees engaged by 
the employer. That includes the union’s own members, and also employees who 
are not members. As Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated 
Engineering Union83 illustrated, a union generally has no interest in encouraging 
the employment of cheaper, non-union labour. The union also wants the agree-
ment to cover both existing employees and any new recruits to the business who 
will be performing work of the same kind. Again, there is no advantage in 
allowing the employer to engage new staff more cheaply. 
In addition, unions typically want the employer to commit to matters benefit-
ing the collective, and not only to matters conferring benefits on individuals. For 
example, in the past, unions have negotiated for automatic payroll deductions of 
union dues — a matter consistently held by the High Court not to be a matter 
pertaining to the individual employment relationship, but a matter of concern to 
the union as a collective.84 Other examples are a commitment that the union play 
a role in grievance-handling procedures, and obligations to consult unions on 
workplace change issues such as planned redundancies, new technologies and 
training schemes. In the current climate — where these kinds of matters may be 
prohibited content under the WRA and WR Regulations — unions may be 
particularly anxious to include such matters in a common law agreement, to 
enhance their own chances of survival post-Work Choices. 
This list of desirable features of agreements creates some immediate problems 
under the general law. The requirement that individual benefits be conferred 
upon non-members or future employees creates privity problems: a common law 
contract can benefit and burden only those who are party to the contract at the 
 
 82 Electrolux (2004) 221 CLR 309, 353 (McHugh J), 368 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); 
Private Arbitration Case (2001) 203 CLR 645, 658 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
 83 (1935) 54 CLR 387. 
 84 See above n 23. As noted in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Ulan Coal 
Mines Ltd (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, 13 October 
2006) [12], there is nothing ‘intrinsically evil’ about such arrangements. 
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time it is made.85 To be a party to a contract, a person must give their informed 
consent, either directly or through an agent authorised to make the contract on 
their behalf. By contrast, a statutory collective workplace agreement requires the 
support of only a simple majority of those who vote on its adoption in order to 
bind all the employees it covers, including any new recruits engaged while the 
agreement remains in force.86 This, of course, is the principal advantage of 
legislating for the recognition and enforcement of collective workplace agree-
ments. So long as the agreement is made according to the formal requirements of 
the statute it will be binding, notwithstanding any concerns about whether each 
and every employee agreed to it. The first obstacle to using common law 
contracts to do essentially the same work as a statutory workplace agreement is 
therefore the doctrine of privity. How can such an agreement be made so as to 
bind the employer in respect of all current and future employees? 
The requirement that the agreement confer benefits on the union as a collec-
tive creates a different kind of problem. The union, as a corporation able to sue 
and be sued in its own name,87 can be a party to such a contract, so privity does 
not present a problem. However, what consideration can the union provide to 
support such a contract? Under the general law, a contract is binding only if it is 
supported by consideration flowing from the promisee to the promisor. Contrac-
tual promises must be purchased — not necessarily with money, but with some 
kind of forbearance.88 
This problem is in fact the easiest to overcome. Contract law’s preoccupation 
with consideration can be dealt with by making the agreement a properly 
executed deed. Execution of a deed provides sufficient evidence of the parties’ 
serious intention to be legally bound by the agreement, so that consideration is 
deemed to be unnecessary,89 except in one respect. Even an agreement made by 
deed will need to be supported by consideration if the agreement purports to 
assign some property right that does not presently exist. This particular rule, 
which is based on the principle that equity will only support an assignment of 
future property if it is supported by executed consideration,90 is unlikely to arise 
in agreements dealing with the matters described above. It may, however, 
become an issue if unions were to attempt to use common law collective 
agreements to bargain for security for employee entitlements by means of 
sophisticated financial instruments. It is a complication which need not concern 
us here. 
The problems that the doctrines of privity and consideration (where there is no 
deed) may cause are illustrated in Ryan v Textile Clothing and Footwear Union 
 
 85 See Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43; 
Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460. See generally J W Carter, 
Elisabeth Peden and G J Tolhurst, Contract Law in Australia (5th ed, 2007) ch 16. 
 86 WRA ss 340(2), 351(b). 
 87 See, eg, WRA sch 1 cl 27. 
 88 See Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 85, ch 6. 
 89 Ibid 111–12. 
 90 See R P Meagher, J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: 
Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002) 242–3. 
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of Australia (‘Ryan’).91 Ryan arose because a company, Homfray Carpets, found 
itself in the hands of receivers. While it was a going concern, the company had 
entered into a number of agreements with unions, representing the industrial 
interests of its employees, to pay above-award redundancy payments should any 
redundancies be necessary. These agreements might have been registered under 
prevailing Victorian legislation, but — for reasons known only to the parties 
themselves — they were not.92 Nevertheless, while the company was solvent it 
maintained a practice of honouring the agreements. 
The trouble arose when the receivers and managers took control and sought to 
retrench many workers. They made all redundancy payments due under the 
prevailing award, but sought directions from the Supreme Court of Victoria 
before making any further payments according to the terms of the unregistered 
collective agreements. Insolvency practitioners are understandably cautious in 
ensuring that dispersal of a company’s assets occurs in accordance with strict 
legal obligations — they can be personally liable to repay any funds improperly 
distributed.93 
The Court held that the unregistered agreements were unenforceable — as 
statutory agreements, because the parties had failed to register them, and as 
contracts, because they failed to satisfy a number of common law requirements. 
First, to satisfy the doctrine of privity, it was necessary to identify the parties to 
each agreement. On its face, only the employer and the unions were signatories 
to the agreements: individual employees were not named as parties, and hence 
had no standing to enforce the agreements by claiming the promised redundancy 
payments. The unions’ argument that their officers had signed the agreements as 
an agent for all employees could not stand on the facts. 
An agency relationship is a consensual relationship, whereby a principal 
authorises the agent to act on the principal’s behalf. Agency cannot arise where 
the principal has no knowledge of the agent, or has not authorised the agent to 
act.94 The unions could not demonstrate that they had been authorised even by 
their own members, let alone by non-members. They certainly could not act as 
agents for any person who was not even an employee at the time the agreements 
were made. According to the doctrine of privity, only those employees who 
actually authorised the unions to act as their agent in entering into the agree-
 
 91 [1996] 2 VR 235. 
 92 The agreements, made in 1991, could have been registered under the Industrial Relations Act 
1979 (Vic), which was in force until 1 March 1993. 
 93 Liquidators are ‘officers’ for the purpose of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9 and are thereby 
subject to the duty of care in s 180. Section 180 is a ‘civil penalty provision’ (s 1317E), and a 
breach can give rise to an order for compensation to the company under s 1317H. Liquidators 
may also be removed for misdirecting payments. Sections 473(1) and 503 allow the court to 
remove a liquidator for ‘cause’, which includes breach of the duty of care: see Andrew R Keay, 
McPherson’s Law of Company Liquidation (4th ed, 1999) 313. For a case involving termination 
payments to employees: see City & Suburban Pty Ltd v Smith (as liquidator of Conpac (Aust) 
Pty Ltd (in liq)) (1998) 28 ACSR 328, 334–6 (Merkel J). 
 94 In Markwick v Hardingham (1880) 15 Ch D 339, 349, James LJ stated: ‘the relation of principal 
and agent requires the consensus of both parties’. See generally G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency 
(2001) 91–3. The principal may be held to have ostensibly authorised an agent by holding the 
agent out as one authorised: see Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) 
Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480, 505 (Diplock LJ). However, the doctrine of ostensible authority still re-
quires the existence of a principal at the time of the agent’s act. 
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ments could be made a party to the agreements.95 Since the agreements were 
drafted in very general terms and purported to apply to all employees, each 
union’s claim to be acting as an agent failed on the facts.96 
Consideration also proved an obstacle in Ryan. When the unions sought to 
enforce the agreements in their own right, as the parties principal, they were 
faced with the argument that they had given no consideration for the employer’s 
promise. It was the employees who provided the work in return for entitlements. 
The document referred to no consideration provided by the unions to support the 
agreements, nor could the unions establish any. The unions’ argument that they 
had given consideration by forbearing from taking industrial action was also 
rejected.97 The taking of industrial action is nothing more than the withdrawal of 
labour by individual employees — the unions could not claim the employees’ 
forbearance as their own. 
The last of the reasons for the unenforceability of the agreements in Ryan was 
what the Court took to be a lack of intention to create legal relations. As Brook-
ing JA stated, it appeared that the agreements ‘were intended by the unions and 
the company to have practical industrial, as opposed to legal, consequences.’98 
Whatever the accuracy of this last view on the particular facts in Ryan, it is 
clear enough that parties to an unregistered agreement may specifically indicate 
their intention to create a legally enforceable contract.99 One way to establish 
such an intent is to record the agreement in a deed. As already noted, the use of a 
deed may also overcome any problem of consideration. Nevertheless, the 
expediency of a deed will not remedy the problem of privity; only those who are 
party to a deed can enforce it. In some jurisdictions, it may be possible to invoke 
statutory provisions that permit a third party who is an intended beneficiary of a 
contractual promise to enforce the contract, notwithstanding the common law 
rule.100 It is also possible that at some point in the future the common law itself 
may come to recognise such an exception.101 For the time being, however, the 
doctrine of privity will in most cases stand in the way of employees enforcing an 
unregistered agreement to which they are not party. 
VIII   OVERCOMING THE PRIVITY PROBLEM 
The privity problem can be managed, and the method for managing it depends 
on the type of commitments or obligations that the agreement contains. Com-
 
 95 Ryan [1996] 2 VR 235, 239 (Brooking JA). 
 96 Ibid. 
 97 See Ibid 270–1 (Hayne JA). 
 98 Ibid 251. 
 99 Assuming that is their intention: cf Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Thiess 
Pty Ltd (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Lawler V-P, 19 October 2006). 
100 See Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) s 56; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55; Property Law Act 
1969 (WA) s 11. Notwithstanding the statutes in which they are contained, these provisions can 
each apply to contracts that do not involve an interest in property. 
101 See Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, where the 
High Court was prepared to create such an exception, but only in relation to insurance contracts. 
A number of judges appeared to lay the groundwork for the development of a more general 
exception, but this has not to date eventuated: see Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 85, 
332–5. 
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mitments made by the employer directly to the union create fewer difficulties 
than commitments made to benefit individual employees.  
A number of the matters listed as ‘prohibited’ by the WRA and WR Regulations 
are matters which can be framed in an agreement as clauses intended to benefit 
the collective.102 For example, a clause which states that the employer would 
permit the union to run training courses on the employer’s premises, during 
working hours, is a clause that would confer an entitlement on a union. The 
union would be privy to that particular obligation. Similarly, a clause which 
states that the employer would grant the union so many seats at the table in any 
meetings to discuss workplace change would directly benefit the union, as an 
organisation in its own right. These matters create no privity problems, and any 
difficulties with consideration can be overcome by using a deed. 
More difficult issues arise when the agreement purports to confer benefits on 
all employees, including those yet to be hired. Even greater problems arise when 
the agreement purports to impose a burden on individual employees. An agree-
ment may, for example, require employees to submit to random drug or alcohol 
testing, or to cooperate with a new system of performance review.103 
We shall deal first with the simpler issue: that is, proposals to provide benefits 
to all employees, including new recruits who have not joined the enterprise at the 
time the agreement is made. The benefits in question might include entitlements 
to certain remedies for capricious or arbitrary dismissal, another matter prohib-
ited by the WRA and WR Regulations.104 
There are at least two ways in which an agreement might effectively confer a 
benefit on a person who is not yet engaged at the time the agreement is made. 
One involves the employer binding itself to include agreed clauses in every new 
employment contract entered into with new recruits. In this way, the deed of 
agreement made between the employer and the union becomes a ‘head agree-
ment’ which stipulates the terms of a multitude of individual employment 
contracts. To ensure that the union can establish its own direct interest in this 
clause, the commitment in the head agreement should be expressed as a promise 
to the union itself. Words to the following effect might be included: 
The employer recognises that the union, as an organisation committed to the 
representation of its members and potential members, has a legitimate concern 
that all employees, whenever they commence work, and whether members of 
the union or not, should enjoy the same benefits. 
Another method would be for the union to enter into the deed as a trustee for 
all employees. Although a person cannot make an agreement as an agent for a 
principal who does not exist at the time the agreement is made,105 a trustee can 
 
102 See WRA s 356; WR Regulations ch 2 reg 8.5. 
103 Cf the features of the registered collective agreements at the University of Western Australia 
which Terence Quickenden sought to establish were not binding on him: Re National Tertiary 
Education Industry Union; Ex parte Quickenden (1996) 140 ALR 385; Quickenden v O’Connor 
(2001) 109 FCR 243. 
104 WR Regulations ch 2 reg 8.5(5). 
105 See Dal Pont, above n 94, 91–3. Even ratification of the act of an agent is impossible unless the 
agent purported to act for the principal at the time of the act: see at 113–14. See also Keighley, 
Maxsted & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240. 
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declare a trust over property for the benefit of a class of beneficiaries, some of 
whom do not exist at the time of the declaration. So long as the class of benefici-
aries is described with sufficient precision that a court can identify who is in and 
who is outside the class at any time that a determination of beneficial interests 
needs to be made, the trust will meet the criterion certainty test imposed by 
English and Australian courts of equity for a valid discretionary trust.106 The 
class of beneficiaries could be described as ‘any person who is or becomes an 
employee of the employer during the currency of this deed’. This will remain 
valid so long as the deed does not exceed any perpetuities period. Perpetuity 
problems are easily avoided by providing that the deed ceases to operate at a 
definable point in time, within the perpetuities period. In New South Wales, this 
is 80 years from the date of making the deed107 — a considerably longer period 
than the usual workplace agreement. 
 Of course, a valid trust also requires property to be the subject of the trust. 
This presents no obstacle, because contractual rights are an established form of 
personal property: ‘A contracting party may be trustee for a third party of that 
chose in action which is constituted by the benefit of a contract.’108 
When the idea of using discretionary trusts in such agreements was raised in a 
public forum attended by a number of interested union leaders,109 at least one 
union advocate expressed some concern. The concern was that a trust would 
necessarily impose onerous fiduciary obligations on the union. Unions would 
not want to risk the prospect that their members — or more likely, non-union 
beneficiaries of such a trust — might sue them for breach of their duties as 
trustees if the union decided not to pursue an action on behalf of a beneficiary in 
a particular case.110 This is one of the peculiarities of trust law. The beneficiaries 
themselves have no right to enforce the terms of any agreement entered into by 
the trustee for their benefit. The beneficiaries’ only right is against the trustee, to 
require the trustee to perform the terms of the trust.111 Commercial trustees (for 
example, of investment trusts) manage the risk of suit by disgruntled beneficiar-
ies by including extensive indemnities in their trust instruments. The same 
protections might be used to shelter union trustees from onerous and open-ended 
fiduciary obligations to employees.  
 
106 See McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424. According to J D Heydon and M J Leeming, the 
criterion certainty test expounded by the House of Lords in this case ‘has come to be regularly 
applied in Australia and New Zealand and should be taken to represent the law’: J D Heydon and 
M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (7th ed, 2006) 68. 
107 See Perpetuities Act 1984 (NSW) s 7. For other jurisdictions: see Perpetuities and Accumula-
tions Act 1985 (ACT) s 8; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) s 187; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) 
s 209; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) ss 61–2; Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1992 (Tas) 
s 6; Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1968 (Vic) s 5; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 101. 
108 Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 85, 325 (citations omitted). See also Heydon and Leeming, 
above n 106, 22–4. 
109 Discussion following presentation by Joellen Riley, ‘Commercial Law Remedies for Workplace 
Problems’ (Speech delivered for Unions NSW, Trades Hall, Sydney, April 2006). 
110 Cf Ellenbogen v Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia, NSW 
Division (1986) 14 IR 381, rejecting the argument that a union owes a legal obligation to its 
members to institute legal action on their behalf. However, no trust was involved in that case. 
111 See Heydon and Leeming, above n 106, 22. 
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In reality, individual beneficiaries can have a rather difficult time enforcing a 
trust. Trustees generally do not care much about this weakness in trust law. For 
them, it is an advantage that it is the trustee and not the individual beneficiary 
who will bear the initial burden of enforcing an agreement with other parties to 
secure rights and entitlements for the beneficiary. It would seem — at least on its 
face — that the trust approach would be one way for a union to maintain 
supervision of the enforcement of those clauses in the agreement that were 
intended to benefit individual employees. In the case of a term which purported 
to provide protection from arbitrary dismissal, this method would restore a role 
for unions in deciding if and when to enforce these clauses, as was the case 
before statutory unfair dismissal regimes extended rights to individual employ-
ees.112 
It should also be noted that while a discretionary trust can benefit employees 
behind their backs and without their knowledge,113 it cannot burden them.114 
Hence, this technique could not be used to enforce a requirement that employees 
submit to a form of testing or performance review which their employment 
contracts would not otherwise allow. If the obligation to be tested or reviewed 
were to be imposed on existing employees, each employee’s personal consent 
would be required. Otherwise, the effect of enforcing the collective agreement 
would be to impose a unilateral variation of the non-union employee’s contract 
of employment, and this might trigger a complaint that the original employment 
contract had been repudiated. 
IX  ENFORCING UNREGISTERED AGREEMENTS 
The chief legal concern among those who use common law agreements is the 
process for enforcing them if trust and cooperation between the parties breaks 
down, or if another person (perhaps a liquidator) takes control of the employing 
corporation. Litigation tends to be expensive, and it will not always be a straight-
forward matter to obtain an order that compels performance of the terms of a 
deed or contract. 
If money is owed to someone who is party to the agreement, then the remedy 
is straightforward enough. An action for debt or money due may be instituted in 
the relevant local or magistrates’ court or, in some jurisdictions, possibly even in 
an industrial tribunal.115 However, if the money is owed to a third party such as 
 
112 The union’s discretion lay in whether to notify a dispute over unfair dismissal to an industrial 
tribunal. In NSW, this ‘gatekeeper’ role was so jealously guarded by unions that it took a Liberal 
government to introduce a right for individual employees to lodge their own unfair dismissal 
claims: see Andrew Stewart, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Unfair Dismissal in New South Wales’ (1992) 
5 Australian Journal of Labour Law 69, 70–1. 
113 Heydon and Leeming, above n 106, 67. 
114 A trust cannot burden a beneficiary, because a burdensome obligation is not property, and 
therefore cannot be the subject of a trust. ‘There can be no trust without property’: Heydon and 
Leeming, ibid. 
115 For example, the Industrial Relations Court of SA and the WA Industrial Relations Commission 
both have jurisdiction over certain contractual claims: see Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) s 14(a); 
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) ss 7(1)(a), 29(1)(b)(ii). There is some doubt, however, as to 
whether this jurisdiction may now be exercised in relation to federal system employers: see the 
contrasting views expressed in Smith v Albany Esplanade Pty Ltd t/as The Esplanade Hotel 
[2007] WAIRC 00192 (Unreported, Smith SC, 2 March 2007) and Armanini v Transfield Ser-
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an individual employee, which is perhaps more likely, a union seeking to enforce 
the agreement would need to seek an order for specific performance compelling 
the employer to make the payment. While courts have shown themselves willing 
to grant such orders in favour of third parties, at least where monetary commit-
ments are involved,116 the fact that the remedy is equitable in nature may 
sometimes require proceedings in a higher court.117 
The real problems occur where the obligation in question is one that does not 
involve the payment of money — for example, where there is a commitment not 
to dismiss employees harshly, unjustly or unreasonably, or to consult over certain 
issues.118 Courts are generally reluctant to grant any orders (including injunc-
tions) that would have the practical effect of compelling parties to perform 
non-monetary obligations. This is especially true where the obligations are of a 
continuing nature and hence would require ongoing supervision by the court, 
and/or where the parties’ relationship involves an element of trust and confi-
dence.119 
A court is far more likely to prefer to award damages. But that remedy also has 
its difficulties in this context. For instance, if an employer fails to fulfil a 
commitment to act fairly in dismissing a worker, what loss does that cause the 
union that is party to the agreement, as opposed to the dismissed worker?120 An 
agreement might purport to impose an obligation on the employer to make some 
agreed payment in such a case. However, unless that sum represented a genuine 
attempt to pre-estimate the loss likely to be suffered as a result of the breach, it 
would be treated by a court as unenforceable by virtue of the rule against 
penalties.121 
X  ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
One obvious way for parties to avoid such problems is to ensure that any 
dispute over their agreement will be dealt with by more informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms, either before, or instead of, going to court. Just as such 
clauses are standard inclusions in registered workplace agreements,122 and 
 
vices (Australia) Pty Ltd (2007) 162 IR 432. Proposals to amend the WA legislation to address 
this problem are currently before Parliament: Industrial and Related Legislation Amendment Bill 
2007 (WA); Contractual Benefits Bill 2007 (WA). 
116 See, eg, Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58; Silver v Dome Resources NL [2007] NSWSC 455 
(Unreported, Hamilton J, 9 May 2007). 
117 See James Crawford and Brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law (4th ed, 2004) 112–13. 
118 This is also a problem with the enforcement of awards or registered collective agreements, 
though at least there the WRA and its state equivalents provide the deterrent of penalties for 
those who breach non-monetary obligations: see Creighton and Stewart, above n 14, 267–8. 
119 See I C F Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, 
Rectification and Equitable Damages (7th ed, 2007) 103–9, 119–25, 598–604. 
120 Though note that where the union has entered into the agreement as a trustee, it may seek to 
recover damages on behalf of an employee-beneficiary. In such a case, the loss to be assessed is 
that of the beneficiary. Once recovered, the damages will themselves be held on trust for the 
beneficiary, and must be paid over on request: see Coulls v Bagot’s Executor and Trustee Co Ltd 
(1967) 119 CLR 460, 501–2 (Windeyer J). 
121 See Carter, Peden and Tolhurst, above n 85, 871–80. 
122 Indeed they are required by s 353 of the WRA. As to the impact of the Work Choices reforms on 
dispute resolution under the WRA: see A Forsyth, ‘Dispute Resolution under WorkChoices: The 
First Year’ (2007) 18(1) Labour and Industry 21. 
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indeed in commercial agreements (especially in industries such as construc-
tion),123 so it is open to the parties to agree that disputes will be resolved by 
some process of mediation and/or arbitration. 
One issue that arises with these clauses is the choice of mediator or arbitrator. 
Clearly, the parties are free to select a private provider, but such a person could 
be expected to charge a fee for their services. Is it possible, though, to appoint a 
member of one of Australia’s publicly funded industrial tribunals and ask (or 
even expect) them to provide their services without charge? 
A  Private Arbitration and the AIRC 
As far as the AIRC is concerned, based on its ruling in Construction, Forestry, 
Mining and Energy Union v Macmahon Contractors Pty Ltd (‘Macmahon’),124 
the formal answer would appear to be ‘no’. In this case the AIRC was asked to 
help resolve a dispute concerning a company’s drug testing procedures, pursuant 
to a dispute resolution clause in a certified agreement that covered any ‘griev-
ance [arising] through the course of employment’.125 A full bench that included 
the President, Giudice J, noted that this formula was broader than the jurisdiction 
conferred by s 170LW of the pre-reform WRA. This permitted agreements to 
empower the AIRC only to ‘settle disputes over the application of the agree-
ment’.126 Since the dispute here did not meet that criterion, the AIRC had no 
power to deal with the matter. As the full bench emphasised: 
the Commission, being a statutory creation, only has the powers which the Act 
confers upon it. This principle has been articulated by the High Court and the 
Commission in a number of cases. It follows that the Commission cannot in-
crease its own jurisdiction by an award or decision it makes and nor can the 
parties to an agreement.127 
Hence, while it is possible for the AIRC to conduct what the High Court de-
scribed as ‘private arbitration’ under the terms of a registered agreement,128 this 
can only be done within the terms of the statutory grant of power.129 By clear 
implication, there can be no authority for the AIRC to arbitrate (or indeed 
 
123 See Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd ed, 2002) 96–102. 
124 (2005) 146 IR 466. 
125 Ibid 467 (Giudice J, Lawler V-P and Raffaelli C). 
126 Ibid 468 (Giudice J, Lawler V-P and Raffaelli C). 
127 Ibid 470 (emphasis added), citing Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, 
Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Telstra Corporation (2003) 128 IR 
385, 393 (Giudice J, Harrison SDP and Simmonds C); Charles Sturt University v National Terti-
ary Education Union (2005) 145 IR 319, 324 (Lawler V-P, O’Callaghan SDP and Harrison C). 
128 See Private Arbitration Case (2001) 203 CLR 645, 658 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
129 Likewise, in relation to a post-Work Choices agreement the AIRC may conduct a dispute 
resolution process only to the extent that it is specifically authorised by the agreement, and then 
only in accordance with the terms of WRA pt 13 div 5. It is possible, however, that an agreement 
may now validly confer on the AIRC a power to resolve disputes over matters that go beyond 
the application of the agreement: see Ross, Trew and Sharard, above n 11, 54–5, noting the 
difference in wording between pre-reform WRA s 170LW and the current WRA s 353(1), though 
the matter is not perhaps as clear as the authors seem to suggest. 
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conciliate or offer any other form of dispute resolution) in situations for which 
the statute does not provide. 
Of course, Macmahon was a case where one of the parties, the employer, 
formally objected to the AIRC taking jurisdiction. If neither party objects to the 
AIRC being given a role for which the WRA does not expressly provide, where is 
the problem? 
Throughout the history of the pre-Work Choices arbitration system, AIRC 
members were prepared to help resolve disputes over which they had no formal 
jurisdiction, provided the parties did not object. Perhaps the most notable 
example was the practice that for many years allowed disputes over the rein-
statement of dismissed workers to be brought before the AIRC, well before the 
first federal unfair dismissal laws were enacted in 1993.130 Employers frequently 
consented to the AIRC dealing with such claims and agreed to abide by its 
‘decision’, even though the dispute in question rarely had the ‘interstate’ 
character required by the statute under which the AIRC was purporting to 
operate.131 At the peak of this informal system, hundreds of cases were dealt with 
by the AIRC each year.132 
Even in more recent times under the WRA, practitioners have become used to 
certain AIRC members offering to adjourn proceedings to ‘go into conference’, 
whether they have the formal power to conciliate or not. The willingness of such 
members to assist, with or without WRA authorisation, in resolving disputes 
underlying the proceedings before the AIRC is one of the reasons many parties 
have retained confidence in the AIRC, despite its reduced role.133 
In spite of the long tradition of ‘informal’ or ‘consent’ dispute resolution in the 
federal tribunal, some awkward questions remain about the use of public 
resources to support activities that are not formally within its statutory jurisdic-
tion. A rare airing of these issues appeared in the judgment of Heerey J of the 
Federal Court of Australia in National Union of Workers v Pacific Dunlop Tyres 
Pty Ltd.134 
In this case, the respondent employer sought to block an application by the 
union and two of its members to institute proceedings alleging a breach of award 
by the employer. According to the employer, the parties had made a binding 
agreement to abide by a previous ‘decision’ issued by Munro J of the AIRC in 
resolving an industrial dispute notified by the union. The evidence showed that 
the parties had consented to Munro J dealing with the matter, despite an apparent 
absence of any interstate element to the dispute. The employer had in effect 
 
130 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth). 
131 Both the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 4, and the subsequent Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 4(1), included in the definition of industrial dispute a requirement 
that it extend ‘beyond the limits of any one State’. 
132 See J O’Donovan, ‘Reinstatement of Dismissed Employees by the Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission: Jurisdiction and Practice’ (1976) 50 Australian Law Journal 636, 
639–40. 
133 See Helen Forbes-Mewett, Gerard Griffin and Don McKenzie, ‘The Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission: Adapting or Dying?’ (2003) 11 International Journal of Employment 
Studies 1; Forsyth, above n 122. 
134 (1992) 37 FCR 419. 
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agreed not to ‘pull jurisdiction’ on the AIRC.135 According to the employer, this 
made Munro J a ‘private arbitrator’, the parties’ agreement to accept his decision 
was one that had contractual effect, and the doctrine of estoppel could be raised 
to prevent the finality of that decision being ignored.136 
In rejecting this contention, Heerey J discussed the difference between ‘private 
arbitration’, where the arbitrator’s power is derived solely from the agreement of 
the parties, and the statutory system of ‘industrial arbitration’.137 In this case, 
everything pointed to Munro J having exercised his statutory role as an industrial 
arbitrator: 
he received submissions from the parties (who addressed him as ‘Your Honour’ 
and not ‘Mr Arbitrator’), conducted conferences, heard evidence and delivered 
a decision which on its face purports to be not the award of a private arbitrator 
but a decision of the Commission under his hand as a Deputy President.138 
Heerey J also rejected any suggestion that the parties had made some form of 
agreement. There was no ‘bargain contracted by mutual promises’, but rather 
‘two parties independently, for reasons which suited each one, taking a similar 
course’ — that being to leave ‘the jurisdictional point in abeyance, in the hope 
that the result of a hearing before an experienced Deputy President of the 
Commission might be acceptable to both sides.’139 
Significantly, however, Heerey J also noted some of the problems that would 
have arisen had Munro J been asked, and consented, to act ‘in the unusual role of 
private arbitrator’: 
The [Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)] contains no indication that members 
of the Commission are required or permitted, as part of their official function, 
to act as private arbitrators. Therefore if, as the employer alleges, the parties in 
fact agreed that Munro J was to act as a private arbitrator, his Honour would 
have had to be aware of that agreement and consent to so act. Presumably he 
would receive payment for his services and would carry out the work in his 
spare time. He would thus probably need the consent of the Minister to engage 
in paid employment outside the duties of his office: see s 25(1) of the Act. 
Since private arbitration and industrial arbitration under the Act are markedly 
different functions, in carrying out the former he would doubtless be at pains to 
make it clear that he was not carrying out the latter, which of course was his 
usual work.140 
As this passage suggests, it is one thing for an AIRC Member to purport to 
exercise a statutory power to deal with a matter that may be beyond their 
jurisdiction, where the parties make a strategic choice not to raise any objection. 
It is quite another for that member to purport to act as a private conciliator or 
arbitrator under the terms of an agreement that can have no statutory effect. It is 
hard to see the basis on which the time, resources and facilities of a statutory 
 
135 Ibid 421–2 (Heerey J). 
136 Ibid 428 (Heerey J). 
137 Ibid 424–6. 
138 Ibid 427 (Heerey J). 
139 Ibid 427–8. 
140 Ibid 426. 
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tribunal can be deployed in such a way, without specific authorisation from 
Parliament. There is certainly nothing in the WRA that expressly permits this to 
happen. 
B  Private Arbitration in the State Tribunals under ‘Referral Agreements’ 
What though of the state tribunals? Four states have recently moved to author-
ise their industrial relations commissions to resolve disputes under private 
industrial agreements.141 Legislation in NSW,142 Queensland143 and South 
Australia144 permits parties to enter into a ‘referral agreement’ that confers 
specified dispute resolution functions on the relevant commission.145 A similar 
proposal is before the Western Australia Parliament.146 In the case of the SA 
Commission, it may exercise all of its ordinary statutory powers under the Fair 
Work Act 1994 (SA), except to the extent that the parties specify otherwise or 
this would conflict with the referral agreement.147 Any decision or order it makes 
in performing its agreed role may also be enforced under this Act.148 In NSW, by 
contrast, provision is made that nothing in the relevant section 
makes any order, determination or other decision of the Commission in respect 
of a dispute binding on the parties to the dispute unless the referral agreement 
operates (apart from this section) to make any such order, determination or de-
cision binding on the parties …149 
There is a similar provision in the Queensland Act.150 
These new provisions are most obviously aimed at employers and unions 
operating in the federal system. For example, parties in NSW and SA are 
expressly permitted to agree on a system of private arbitration for unfair dis-
missal claims.151 Under the WRA, not only are many employees now excluded 
 
141 Tasmania also permits a form of ‘private arbitration’ of industrial disputes by its Industrial 
Commission: see Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas) s 61. However, this provision predates the 
Work Choices reforms and does not require a formal agreement by the parties, merely a joint 
request to the President. Section 61 has been amended by Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
2007 (Tas) s 9, allowing private conciliation as an alternative to arbitration. 
142 Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) s 146A, amended by the Industrial Relations Amendment 
Act 2006 (NSW) s 3, sch 1(3). 
143 Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 273A, amended by the Industrial Relations Act and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) s 25. 
144 Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA) sch 1. This Act, 
formerly known as the Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (SA), was amended and renamed by 
the Statutes Amendment (Public Sector Employment) Act 2006 (SA) pt 8. 
145 See also Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) s 146B; Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas) 
s 19A, which authorise the NSW and Tasmanian Commissions respectively to perform dispute 
resolution processes under either a federal workplace agreement or the ‘model dispute resolution 
process’ in WRA pt 13 div 2 where selected by the parties concerned. 
146 Employment Dispute Resolution Bill 2007 (WA). 
147 Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA) sch 1 cl 2(6). 
148 Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA) sch 1 cl 2(10). 
149 The parties can provide for a right of appeal to the full bench of the NSW Industrial Relations 
Commission under Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) s 146A(9). As to the nature of such an 
appeal: see Australian Workers’ Union v Bluescope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2006) 157 IR 93. 
150 Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) s 273A(5). 
151 Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) s 146A(4)(b); Commercial Arbitration and Industrial 
Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA) sch 1 cl 2(1)(c). A referral agreement under s 273A of the 
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from lodging such a claim with the AIRC under Division 4 of Part 12,152 but 
workplace agreements are (as we have seen) specifically prohibited from 
seeking to provide any right or remedy in relation to a harsh, unjust or unreason-
able termination.153 
While the SA and Queensland provisions had only recently taken effect at the 
time of writing, the NSW system has been in operation since March 2006. A 
number of major corporations have already signalled their willingness to use it. 
For example, BlueScope Steel is recorded as having entered into a ‘protocol’ 
with a number of unions that imposes an obligation to complete referral agree-
ments whenever ‘the need arises for the Commission to assist in resolving 
industrial disputes’.154 As of December 2007, there have been around 20 reported 
instances of the NSW Industrial Relations Commission arbitrating disputes 
involving the company under s 146A of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 
(NSW).155 
The question remains, though, whether state provisions of this kind can validly 
have effect in relation to federal system parties. With certain exceptions, s 16 of 
the WRA automatically excludes state or territory industrial laws from applying 
to federal system employers. The definition of a ‘State or Territory industrial 
law’ in s 4(1) of the WRA expressly includes the Industrial Relations Acts in both 
NSW and Queensland, and hence their provisions on ‘referral agreements’. The 
definition also includes any Act that ‘applies to employment generally’ and that 
has as ‘one or more of its main purposes … regulating workplace relations 
(including industrial matters, industrial disputes and industrial action within the 
ordinary meaning of those expressions)’.156 This would seem to catch the 
Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA), 
which undoubtedly seeks to regulate industrial disputes. Given that the subject 
matter of sch 1 is reflected in the title of this Act, it is hard to deny that a ‘main 
purpose’ of the statute is to deal with such issues — especially as it need only be 
a main purpose, not the main purpose. 
Section 16(1) of the WRA states that the Act is ‘intended to apply to the exclu-
sion of [state or territory industrial laws] so far as they would otherwise apply in 
relation to an employee or employer’. The NSW Commission has consistently 
sought to interpret this provision narrowly, so as to preserve the operation of 
state laws in relation to constitutional corporations and other federal system 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) may deal with an ‘industrial dispute’, which is defined in 
sch 5 to mean a dispute over an ‘industrial matter’. That term is in turn defined broadly enough 
in s 7 to include a dispute over a dismissal. 
152 See Anna Chapman, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law and Work Choices: From Safety Net Standard to 
Legal Privilege’ (2006) 16(2) Economic and Labour Relations Review 237; Marilyn J Pittard, 
‘Fairness in Dismissal: A Devalued Right’ in Julian Teicher, Rob Lambert and Anne O’Rourke 
(eds), WorkChoices: The New Industrial Relations Agenda (2006) 74. 
153 See WR Regulations ch 2 reg 8.5(5). 
154 Australian Workers Union v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWIRComm 1029 
(Unreported, Connor C, 5 June 2007) [3]. 
155 At the time of writing, the most recent was Abbott v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2007] 
NSWIRComm 1097 (Unreported, Connor C, 19 December 2007). 
156 WRA s 4(1). 
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employers.157 Although the point does not appear to have been argued, the 
Commission seems to have proceeded on the basis that s 146A of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1996 (NSW) is somehow unaffected by the WRA.158 
By contrast, the breadth of the exclusion in s 16(1) of the WRA has been em-
phasised by both the High Court and a Full Court of the Federal Court. In 
upholding the constitutional validity of the provision, a majority of the High 
Court stressed that it is open to the Commonwealth to define a ‘field’ of regula-
tion, pass laws that relate to that field, and thereby exclude the states from 
trespassing on it. This can be done regardless of whether the federal regime 
actually deals with some of the matters covered by the state laws that will be 
excluded.159 
In Tristar Steering & Suspension Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of 
New South Wales,160 the Full Court of the Federal Court held that s 16 of the 
WRA precluded the NSW Commission from conducting an inquiry into an 
industrial dispute involving a federal system employer, irrespective of whether 
the Commission sought to impose any obligations on that employer. Each of the 
judges stressed that s 16 was to be interpreted broadly. According to Buchanan J: 
By its terms s 16 of the WRA declares an intent that the WRA occupy, to the 
exclusion of the [Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW)], (subject only to the 
exceptions in s 16(2), (3) and (4) — which are not here relevant), the whole 
field of legislative activity ‘in relation to an employee or employer’ (my 
emphasis) where the employer is an entity identified by s 6(1) of the WRA, 
including a constitutional corporation. The words ‘in relation to’ are broad. 
They are not confined to exclude only actual regulation of specific rights and 
obligations but anything done by or under a State or Territory industrial law. 
Furthermore, although in many, perhaps most, cases it is the relationship of 
employer and employee, or the relations of an employer with its employee or 
employees, which will provide the practical foundation from which s 16 
commences that should not be understood to import a limitation upon, or add a 
further gloss to, the words ‘in relation to an employee or employer’. Matters 
which concern them individually, or separately, are also within the field 
covered.161 
 
157 See, eg, Australian Workers Union v Australian Steel Mill Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWIR-
Comm 1141 (Unreported, Connor C, 6 October 2006); Re Inquiry into Matter Relating to Avail-
ability of Work at Tristar Steering & Suspension Australia Ltd (2007) 161 IR 50. The Commis-
sion has taken a similarly broad view of the scope of the exclusions in WRA s 16(2), (3): see, eg, 
Re Transport Industry — Mutual Responsibility for Road Safety (State) Award and Contract 
Determination [No 2] (2006) 158 IR 17; cf Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, 
Mining and Energy Union [2007] FCAFC 177 (Unreported, Ryan, Moore and Mansfield JJ, 
22 November 2007). WR Regulations ch 2 reg 1.2(2) has also been interpreted broadly, preserv-
ing the operation of state laws relating to pre-Work Choices matters: see, eg, Skilltech Consult-
ing Services Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (NSW) (2007) 160 IR 73. 
158 Cf Australian Workers Union v BlueScope Steel Pty Ltd [2007] NSWIRComm 1088 (Unre-
ported, Connor C, 3 December 2007), where Commissioner Connor was prepared to accept that 
while the Commission could take jurisdiction under a referral agreement, it could not exercise 
that jurisdiction in such a way as to vary a preserved state agreement that had effect as a federal 
instrument under WRA sch 8. 
159 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1, 166 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
160 (2007) 158 FCR 104. 
161 Ibid 114–15. See also the reasoning at 107–8 (Kiefel J), 109–10 (Gyles J). 
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On this interpretation of s 16 of the WRA, there is a strong argument that the 
new dispute resolution provisions in NSW, Queensland and SA cannot validly 
apply to federal system employers and employees. If so, then the respective 
commissions would not be authorised to perform the functions for which a 
referral agreement might provide, at least where such parties are involved. The 
only exceptions would be where a dispute concerned one of the ‘non-excluded 
matters’ listed in s 16(3) of the WRA, such as occupational health and safety, 
child labour or long service leave. 
Once again, the question may be posed whether any of this matters if the 
parties have consented to the state tribunal arbitrating their dispute. The point 
could obviously arise if a party was unhappy enough with the outcome of 
‘private’ arbitration to challenge the power of the tribunal to act. A more intrigu-
ing question might be whether a disgruntled party could even sue the arbitrator 
for something said or done in discharging their duties under the agreement. 
Members of industrial tribunals generally have the usual judicial immunity from 
suit in performing their statutory functions.162 However, as the High Court noted 
in Fingleton v The Queen,163 there are limits to this immunity. Gleeson CJ 
quoted Lord Bridge to the effect that it is ‘clear that the holder of any judicial 
office who acts in bad faith, doing what he knows he has no power to do, is 
liable in damages.’164 Furthermore, as Kirby J tellingly observed, 
[s]imply because an action is performed by a person who is a judicial officer 
does not, without more, attract the immunity. Nor does the fact that the action 
was done during work hours, in or from the judicial officer’s chambers, on of-
ficial notepaper or otherwise with an outward semblance of official conduct, 
afford the immunity if the reality posited by the legislation is missing.165 
There has not to date been any definitive ruling from the higher courts as to 
the applicability of the NSW, Queensland or SA ‘referral agreement’ provisions 
to federal system parties. For the time being, members of the respective tribunals 
may no doubt continue to enjoy their usual immunity from suit, on the basis that 
they are exercising a jurisdiction and powers that they presumably believe, in 
good faith, to exist. But should an adverse finding be made by the courts, and in 
the absence of a plausible argument that the dispute concerns a ‘non-excluded 
matter’, it might be a very different story — whatever the willingness of the 
parties to consent to the tribunal arbitrating. 
C  The Commercial Arbitration Acts 
A further issue with the use of private dispute resolution processes under 
unregistered agreements is how the outcomes of such a process might be 
enforced, or indeed challenged. To the extent that an agreement provides for 
some form of private arbitration, it would seem that the Commercial Arbitration 
 
162 See, eg, WRA s 97; Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) sch 2 cls 7–8; Industrial Relations Act 
1999 (Qld) s 337; Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) s 44. 
163 (2005) 227 CLR 166. 
164 Ibid 185, quoting Re McC (A Minor) [1985] AC 528, 540 (emphasis added). 
165 Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166, 226 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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Acts in each state and territory would apply.166 These Acts pertain to any 
‘arbitration agreement’, a term uniformly defined to mean ‘an agreement in 
writing to refer present or future disputes to arbitration’.167 Despite the title of 
the legislation, there is no requirement that the agreement in question be ‘com-
mercial’ in nature.168 
Assuming these Acts did apply, one consequence under s 33 of the each Act 
would be that any ‘award’ made by the arbitrator would be enforceable in the 
relevant state or territory supreme court (or in some instances a lower court in 
that jurisdiction) as if it were a judgment issued by that court. Furthermore, it 
would be open to either party, unless the agreement provided otherwise, to 
appeal an arbitrator’s decision to that court on ‘any question of law’ arising out 
of the award.169 Other roles that the court might play, subject in some instances 
to the agreement providing otherwise, would include: 
• appointing an arbitrator, where the parties cannot agree and there is no 
other method of filling the vacancy;170 
• issuing subpoenas to compel attendance before an arbitrator or the produc-
tion of a document,171 or compelling persons to do such things when or-
dered by an arbitrator;172 
• setting aside on arbitrator’s award, on the basis that there has been ‘mis-
conduct’ by the arbitrator (including ‘corruption, fraud, partiality, bias, and 
a breach of the rules of natural justice’),173 or that the award or the arbitra-
tion itself has been ‘improperly procured’;174 and 
 
166 See Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT); Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW); 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (NT); Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld); Commercial 
Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA); Commercial Arbitration Act 
1986 (Tas); Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic); Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA). In 
the case of the SA Act, the reference here is to the main part of the statute, as opposed to the 
recently added provisions in sch 1 which have already been discussed. It is possible though that 
if sch 1 causes the Act to be regarded as a ‘State or Territory industrial law’ for the purpose of 
the exclusion in WRA s 16(1)(a), then the rest of the statute is likewise precluded from applying 
to arbitration agreements made by federal system employers. The exclusion in WRA s 16(1)(a) 
should not affect the other Commercial Arbitration Acts, since none of them can be said to have 
a ‘main purpose’ of ‘regulating workplace relations’: see WRA s 4(1) definition of ‘State or 
Territory industrial law’. 
167 Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT) s 2; Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s 4(1); 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (NT) s 4(1); Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld) s 4; 
Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agreements Act 1986 (SA) s 4(1); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1986 (Tas) s 4(1); Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic) s 4(1); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) s 4(1). 
168 For a general discussion of the Commercial Arbitration Acts: see Astor and Chinkin, 
above n 123, 298–311. See also Ross, Trew and Sharard, above n 11, 57–9. 
169 Commercial Arbitration Acts s 38. 
170 Commercial Arbitration Acts s 10. 
171 Commercial Arbitration Acts s 17. 
172 Commercial Arbitration Acts s 18. 
173 ‘Misconduct’ is uniformly defined: see Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT) s 2; Commer-
cial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s 4(1); Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (NT) s 4(1); Com-
mercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld) s 4; Commercial Arbitration and Industrial Referral Agree-
ments Act 1986 (SA) s 4(1); Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (Tas) s 4(1); Commercial Arbitra-
tion Act 1984 (Vic) s 4(1); Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) s 4(1). 
174 Commercial Arbitration Acts s 42. 
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• removing an arbitrator, on the ground of their misconduct, incompetence or 
unsuitability, or because they have been subject to undue influence.175 
It remains to be seen whether parties to industrial agreements seek to take 
advantage of any of these provisions. 
One problem with the application of the Commercial Arbitration Acts to indus-
trial agreements is the possibility of inconsistency with the terms of the industrial 
statutes in each jurisdiction. This is most obviously the case where the agreement 
in question has been registered under the WRA. Even if the Commercial Arbitra-
tion Acts are not automatically excluded by the terms of s 16(1) of the WRA,176 
they are plainly inconsistent with the detailed rules for dispute resolution and 
compliance laid down by Parts 13 and 14 of the WRA and as such would be 
overridden by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution.177 But it is also unclear 
whether the Commercial Arbitration Acts can or do apply where a ‘referral 
agreement’ is made in accordance with the state provisions discussed in 
Part X(B) above. None of the relevant statutes clarify how any inconsistency 
between the two regimes is to be resolved,178 though presumably the ‘industrial’ 
provisions would prevail on the basis of being enacted more recently. 
XI  LOOKING AHEAD 
The highly restrictive Work Choices model of statutory collective agreement 
making has generated avoidance strategies — or at least perpetuated those 
originally spawned by the Electrolux decision.179 The newly elected ALP 
government has promised a ‘freedom to bargain collectively without excessive 
government rules and regulations’, with no ‘onerous, complex and legalistic 
restrictions on agreement content’ and a capacity to reach agreement on ‘what-
ever matters suit’ the bargaining participants, subject only to the requirement that 
the terms be ‘lawful’.180 
The ALP has clarified this policy platform, stating that anything contravening 
the freedom of association rules, including (much to the annoyance of certain 
unions) any provision for bargaining services fees, will remain prohibited.181 
That aside, and subject to a greatly strengthened ‘safety net’ to prevent award or 
statutory entitlements being bargained away, it would seem that freedom of 
contract is to rule. It will be interesting, though, to see whether the ALP govern-
ment will be prepared to jettison anything in the nature of a matters pertaining 
requirement, as the wording of its policy might seem to suggest. 
 
175 Commercial Arbitration Acts s 44. 
176 See above n 166. 
177 See WRA s 18(1), which provides that WRA s 16 is ‘not a complete statement of the circum-
stances’ in which inconsistency may arise between the Act and a state or territory law. 
178 A deficiency especially notable in the case of the Commercial Arbitration and Industrial 
Referral Agreements Act 1984 (SA), which says nothing about the relationship of the new sch 1 
to the remainder of the Act. 
179 (2004) 221 CLR 309. 
180 Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, ‘Forward with Fairness: Labor’s Plan for Fairer and More 
Productive Australian Workplaces’ (Policy Statement, 28 April 2007) 13–15. 
181 See Julia Gillard, ‘Howard’s IR Policy an Unfair Mess’ (Press Release, 8 May 2007). 
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In the longer term though, the question is whether we can envisage a sustain-
able system of collective workplace agreement making based entirely on the 
common law. As the discussion above has explained, the common law is 
generally an unwieldy tool for dealing with multi-party agreements, and it is 
particularly inept in creating obligations which will bind a group of people 
without individual consent by every member of the group. The doctrine of 
privity creates that problem, while the discretionary trust provides an ingenious, 
but perhaps unnecessarily complex, solution. 
Enforcing common law agreements can also be an expensive and complex 
process. The common law often refuses to provide genuinely useful remedies 
(such as reinstatement of workers, and orders for the specific performance of 
other obligations, such as consultation rights) on the basis that to do so would 
yoke together unwilling parties to a personal services contract. The easiest way 
around these obstacles may still be to legislate for a system of collective bargain-
ing. Whether that system needs to involve registered agreements, or whether it 
would be sufficient to allow agreements to operate on a private basis albeit with 
some modification to the contractual rules and remedies that would otherwise 
apply, is a question that merits further consideration. 
